August 17, 2013
Latest Update: August 17, 2013 08:14 am
Ahmad Fuad Rahmat also writes for the ProjekDialog.com collective and is a member of the Islamic Renaisance Front. He works for the Centre for Independent Journalism and is a co-host for Night School on BFM Radio. He was trained in political philosophy.
The current attacks against Shias in Malaysia are linked to four interacting factors
1. The Syrian Civil War
Any informed view of the current Syrian conflict will conclude that it is primarily caused by geopolitics. The interest of The United States and Israel is to dismantle Bashar Assad's regime, since it is a key strategic ally for Hezbollah and Iran.
Hezbollah and Iran are the only two remaining forces in the region that can pose a significant threat to the occupation of Palestine and America's wider interest in the Middle East, and they also happen to be Shia.
The claim that the Syrian conflict is essentially sectarian is therefore the projection and/or exploitation of suspicions against Shias to match the current political mood.
This has been brewing for some time. One case in point was the 2006 Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon (Hezbollah's stronghold) where many Sunni Muslim figureheads called for the support of Israel while smearing Shias as the greater enemy for their supposedly deviant ways.
Hezbollah's victory, however, made it very popular in the Arab World, as it demonstrated certain courage and resolve against the Zionist occupation that was lacking among the majority of Arab governments, who often appear to be more willing to work with Israel's demands.
But the sympathies it garnered then are certainly waning. Eminent and influential cleric Yusuf Al Qardawi openly labelled Hezbollah as the Party of Satan while calling for Sunnis to join the fight for Assad's downfall.
Two widely-read newspapers, Ashraq al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, have condemned Hezbollah's support for Assad and their eventual participation into the civil war. In the meantime, tensions are compounded as Sunni-Shia skirmishes in Lebanon and Iraq are mutating into further confrontation and violence, heightening insecurities.
All of the above weave together to form a sectarian narrative of the Syrian conflict which is increasingly pervasive.
What does any of this have to do with Malaysia? Like much of the Islamic world, developments in the Middle East feature prominently in Muslim discourse. There is, for one, the inevitable historical references: the Arabian Peninsula was where Islam began, and Baghdad was where its Golden Age took shape. Egypt stands out not only for Al-Azhar University but also for where the Muslim Brotherhood - the pioneering political Islamic movement of the 20th century - began.
The recent outrage towards the ouster of Muhammad Morsi, so strongly declared by Muslim organisations aligned to both Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat, is just one example of how strongly sentiments from the Middle East can resonate here.
There is also a more direct connection. As of 2010, there are more than 10 thousand Malaysians studying in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt, majoring in Islamic studies, medicine, engineering and business. This annual cycle of graduates returning from the Middle East has been in motion since the 1980s, and with it, the importation of the prevailing sentiments there.
Sensitivity towards the Syrian conflict is therefore not exempt from the view here. While there is, rightly, much outrage against Bashar Assad's tyrannical rule, this has largely been expressed in the Middle East and Malaysia alike in sectarian terms, thereby fueling further hostility towards Malay Malaysian Shias.
2. The influence of religious men
Many influential ustaz have gone on record to cast Shias in a negative light. It is not surprising to see the usual host of conservatives engaging in the vilification, although the Shia case is unique in that it evokes animosity even from across the partisan divide. Even ustaz who are otherwise apolitical are partaking.
The list is astonishingly long. It includes Muhammad Asri Zainul Abidin, Fathul Bari, Zahazan Mohamed, Zaharuddin Abdul Rahman, Aizam Mas'od, Fadlan Othman, Azwira Abdul Aziz, Abdul Basit Abdul Rahman,Abdullah Yasin and Abdullah Din among others (many of them, incidentally, are also graduates of Islamic higher education in Jordan).
Some of their premises evoke the current situation in Syria, although for the most part they underscore doctrinal differences.
There are of course ulama who have resisted the bandwagon. Hadi Awang's take on Syria, for example, is timely and accurate. But by and large negative sentiments are finding more appeal largely because the influence of religious personalities with access to mosques and the media.
3. Political convenience
The prevalence of such sentiments presents an opportunity for political exploitation: Put simply, Shias make good fictional villains to scare the Sunni Malay majority with. Christians make for convenient external bogeymen, but with Shias, fears of an "internal" threat can be stoked.
At any rate, what we are witnessing at the moment is only the beginning. This will continue to have distinct manifestations in different contexts. Kedah is interesting to note for its longstanding Shia population (descendants of the Shia community in Melaka from generations ago who fled to Southern Thailand after the Portuguese defeated the Sultanate).
Whole Shia villages exist today and while the occasional and minor bickering with Sunnis are not unheard of, the situation does not call for the kind of sweeping panic urged by religious authorities.
Is it also a plot to destabilize PAS? Mat Sabu himself has claimed that it is directed toward his ouster. But it is interesting to note that the daily vilifications from so many official and unofficial quarters have not resulted to anything more than the odd finger pointing and rumor mongering.
Moreover, it is not as if this is the first time that the Shia scare tactic is being used against the party. If much will change in the direction PAS takes after the Muktamar, it will be unlikely due to the current anti-Shia fever, which when viewed from a larger perspective is pale in comparison to the challenges the party had survived in the past.
The fact remains that arguments for a strong state, what more one with religious legitimacy, are always much easier to sell in a climate of fear. As it stands, it seems likely and tragically that the Malaysian Shia community will be collateral damage for the political interests of whichever career politician of the week looking to boost their religious credentials.
4. A conservative culture
The easy answer is to point to the authorities as the force behind all religious divisions and fear mongering in this country. While there is truth to this, it is the incomplete picture.
For one, a great deal, if not most, of the anti-Shia sentiments are stoked by Muslim preachers who are not aligned to any formal religious institutions (who one would also be accurate to identify as more PR leaning).
Furthermore, fear would not travel so far and wide if there isn't a mass to find it convincing in the first place. We shouldn't view society as comprised solely of malleable individuals with no sense of their own agency.
In an age of information, fear too is a choice, what more in a setting like Malaysia where power is viewed in terms of communal competition, in which the vilification of Shias is just one dimension. - August 17, 2013.
* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insider.
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